

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08STATE67398, MTCR: ARGENTINE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE (SLV)

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08STATE67398**.

| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 08STATE67398 | 2008-06-23 20:38 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State |

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1367868-eeuu-temio-un-plan-para-revivir-el-misil-condor>

P R 232038Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 067398

BUENOS AIRES FOR EST

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2033
TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [KSCA](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [TSPA](#) [AR](#)

SUBJECT: MTCR: ARGENTINE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE (SLV)
PROGRAM

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 691 (AND PREVIOUS)
[1](#)B. STATE 50050 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
Reason: 1.5 (B), (D).

[1](#)1. (U) Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
Reason: 1.5 (B), (D).

[1](#)2. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Buenos Aires,
please see paragraph 7.

¶3. (C) BACKGROUND: REF A reports the government of Argentina's (GOA's) initial reaction to the U.S. request for additional transparency on Argentina's space launch program (SLV) and requests further details concerning how Washington agencies envision conducting the proposed "annual consultations" and periodic site visits.

¶4. (C) PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: As noted in REF B, the U.S. seeks a GOA commitment to provide the United States with full transparency into its SLV program, including annual consultations on the status of the program and on imports/exports relating to the program, and the option of periodic site/s visits. As an additional transparency measure, we also seek Argentina's commitment to brief its 33 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners on its SLV program - perhaps via a short information paper - and to describe its SLV efforts in its annual declaration to the HCOC.

¶5. (C) We believe that this arrangement -- agreement to hold annual consultations and the option for periodic site visits -- will keep the SLV issue from being an irritant in our bilateral relationship. It also will reinforce our mutual missile nonproliferation objectives by providing ongoing insight into the Argentine program and opportunities for the U.S. to consult with Argentina if program developments - including imports/exports relating to the program - raise questions and/or if questions should arise regarding the migration of technology and equipment from the SLV program to an MTCR Category I offensive military missile system. Additionally, we believe asking Argentina to provide a one-time briefing to the MTCR is an appropriate way for the GOA to demonstrate transparency and accountability to the MTCR for fulfilling its commitments to the MTCR in the early 1990s concerning SLVs and the Falda del Carmen facilities.

¶6. (C) In response to the GOA's request for more information (REF A), we therefore want to provide further elaboration of our thinking concerning annual consultations on the status of Argentina's SLV program and the option for periodic site/s visits. In particular, we want to indicate that the U.S. would envision the "annual consultations" being a half-day to one-day meeting that would be held on a mutually agreed date each year in either Washington or Buenos Aires (venue would alternate). We also would expect both sides to be represented by an appropriate expert-level delegation, and not high-profile senior officials. For example, we would anticipate that the U.S. delegation would be led by the State Department's Director for Missile Threat Reduction and would include representatives and technical experts from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State.

While the specific agenda for the "annual consultations" would need to be agreed in advance by the two governments, we would generally expect the meeting to include a status report by the Argentine side on the SLV program. We also would expect the U.S. side to raise any questions it might have about program developments and/or imports/exports relating to the SLV program. Additionally, and as relevant and appropriate, we would anticipate the U.S. side sharing information with the GOA concerning proliferation-related activities of third countries and/or non-state actors that would be helpful to the GOA's efforts to implement and maintain sufficient safeguards to ensure that the SLV program is not used - even inadvertently - as a source of supply by proliferators. Finally, with regard to site visits, our expectation would be that this would largely be managed by the GOA inviting U.S. Embassy officials to witness program milestones and affording them unfettered access to the SLV program, including all relevant equipment and personnel. However, we would not want to preclude the possibility of Washington officials visiting the GOA's SLV program facilities at some future date.

¶7. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Drawing on the information provided in paragraphs 4-6 above, request Embassy Buenos Aires convey to CONAE Director Varotto and appropriate Argentine MFA

officials U.S. thinking on the nature of the SLV-related transparency measures we are seeking, and report response. Post should underscore that the U.S. intent is not/not to create unwieldy or overly burdensome confidence building measures, but to establish a transparency mechanism whereby we can have confidence that the Argentine SLV program is moving forward in a manner consistent with our shared missile nonproliferation objectives. Post also should stress that we recognize and appreciate Argentina's leadership on nonproliferation matters and hope we can work together to address SLV transparency in a mutually satisfactory way.

18. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham (Phone: 202-647-4931). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN and WHA.
RICE

NNNN

End Cable Text